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Consolidation of Democracy:
The Recent 1\irkish Experience
METIN HEPER AND AYLIN GUNEY
The significant differences among regions and even countries aboutthe relations between governments and militaries make it impossible to
develop an overarching theory of civil-military relations and the prospects
for the consolidation of democracy. Prior to the transition to democracy,
officers in Latin America functioned as political elites and exercised power
in their own right; in contrast, officers in Eastern Europe were coopted by
the communist parties and subjected to intense political indoctrination.
Consequently, while in Latin America the consolidation of democracy
required the demilitarization of politics, in Eastern Europe it required the
depoliticization ofthe military.'
In Latin America, at the time of the transition to democracy the military
retained too many privileges.^ Thus politicians in that continent wished to
have greater say about the resources previously controlled by the military so
that they could pursue client-oriented policies to gamer votes,^ and they
removed officers from state economic enterprises and allocated more funds
to civilian ministries.'* In Eastern Europe, because the military had earlier
come under the domination of communist parties, the depoliticization ofthe
military by the political elite became critical. The best example here is
Hungary, where Western democratic values have been quite successfully
inculcated in the military.'
Turkey constitutes yet another case of civil-military relations that
resemble the civil-military relations in Germany between the two World
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Wars and in France ofthe early 1960s.* The consolidation of democracy in
Turkey depended upon circumstances different from those in Latin America
and Eastern Europe. As far as officers and, for that matter, the bulk of the
Westernized elite in Turkey were concerned, an indispensable prerequisite
for basing one 's decisions on informed judgment had been secularism.' This
was because from the early part of the nineteenth century to the present, the
elite in question equated Islam with irrationality; they thought that Islam had
fallen out of phase with life and could not be adapted to modern circum-
stances.^ They perceived a close relationship between the demise of the
Ottoman Empire and the persistent opposition of religion to the moderniza-
tion efforts of the late eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth
centuries. Thus, these elite perceived secularism as the most important
dimension of the republican ideology. In the republican period (1923 to the
present), officers gradually became the most ardent guardians of secularism.
The military's direct interventions in politics in Turkey in 1960-1961,
1971-1973, and 1980-1983 had the ultimate purpose of safeguarding the
secular-democratic state in Turkey. '
At the same time, for officers, and for the rest of the Westernized elite
in Turkey, modernization meant Westernization. They thus concluded that
an important component of Westernization was democracy. However, they
favored "rational democracy,"'" that is, taking democracy as an intelligent
debate among the educated for the purpose of deciding upon the best policy
option." As a result, from the late nineteenth century onward, officers and
the other Westernized elite increasingly perceived Turkey's salvation in
introducing and maintaining a democratic as well as a secular state. It was
thought, and the military agreed, that final authority rested with the civilian
government.'^
The antecedents of the military having a privileged position in Turkish
polity hark back to the end ofthe thirteenth century when the military played
a key role in the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman State
was born as a ghazi (warrior) state on the borderland of two rival religions
and civilizations. '̂  In the early centuries of the Ottoman Empire the military
continued to play a primary role in state affairs. For this reason, for a long
time the Ottoman ruling institution was referred to as Askeri (the military).
During the period of decline (from the second part of the sixteenth to the end
of the eighteenth century), the Ottoman state was virtually ruled by an
oligarchy ofthe military, the civil bureaucracy, and the religious institution.
During the nineteenth century, the military emerged first as the object and
then the subject of modernization."*
The founders of the Turkish Republic (Ataturk and Ismet Inonli), too,
had military backgrounds. During the single-party years of 1923-1950,
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although the military was subordinated to the civilian government, it was
nevertheless considered as the ultimate guarantee ofthe secular republic. On
the other hand, with a secular modern education in the 1930s and 1940s, the
military emerged as the champion of a democratic as well as secular state.
Thus, in the late 1940s, young officers in particular began to have sympathies
for the newly emergent Democratic Party that challenged the "authoritarian
rule" of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or CHP).
During the 1950s, the military shared the role of being a guardian of the
secular-democratic state with the CHP. From the 1960s onward, with the
fragmentation and polarization of Turkish politics on the dimensions of left-
right, secular-Islamic, and cultural versus ethnic nationalism, and with the
shift of the CHP from the center to the periphery, the military remained as
virtually the sole protector of the secular-democratic state in Turkey.'^
The military's assumption of this role had a legal basis as well.
According to Article 35 of the Internal Service Act of the Turkish Armed
Forces (enacted in 1961), "the military is responsible for defending both the
Turkish Fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitu-
tion." According to the 1982 Turkish Constitution, the Turkish Republic is,
among other things, a secular republic. Article 85 of the Internal Service
Regulations ofthe Turkish Armed Forces stipulates that the "Turkish Armed
Forces shall defend the country against the internal as well as the external
threats, if necessary by force." The military plays a role in government
through the participation of the High Command in the National Security
Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu or MGK). The MGK is made up of the
president, prime minister, ministers of national defense, internal affairs and
foreign affairs, chief of general staff, commanders of the army, navy, air
force, and of the gendarmerie. It convenes under the chairmanship of the
president. According to Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution, the MGK
"shall submit to the Council of Ministers its recommendations against the
internal and external security ofthe country." The same article stipulates that
the Council of Ministers gives priority to the recommendations ofthe MGK
concerning the measures that the MGK deems necessary for the preservation
of "the existence and independence of the State, the integrity and the
indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of the country."
It was in such a setting that on 28 June 1996, the religiously oriented
Refah (Welfare) Party became the senior member of a coalition government
(Refahyol) formed by Refah led by Necmettin Erbakan and the True Path
Party led by Tansu filler. Refah's venerable leader Necmettin Erbakan
became Prime Minister."" This development caused consternation among
the officers and the rest of the Westernized elite in Turkey, who became
anxiety-ridden about the secular-democratic state in that country.
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As noted, the very target of the early republican reformers was the hold
of religion on the society and the polity." Islam was to resemble the Protestant
tradition that placed emphasis on the absolute privacy of individual conscience.
After the death of Ataturk, founder of Turkey, in 1938, apart from the return of
Muslim chaplains to the army and the introduction of elective courses on Islam
in the state grade schools, not much has changed.'^ In the multiparty period
(from 1946 to the present), the state continued to monitor Islam closely. As it
has been aptly put, "Turkey has always allowed Islam to use what means it can
to spread itself provided that the Islamic institution is not recreated outside and
apart from the state."" Such limited religious openings in the 1950s as the
reintroduction of the call to prayer in Arabic and somewhat expanded
religious instruction in the grade schools were not the product of profound
soul-searching or of a spiritual crisis. They were the consequences of
chiefly utilitarian and political considerations—the quest for a secure
foundation of common morality, the need for a united front against commu-
nism, and, above all, the never-ending competition for electoral votes.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Turkish Islam has been described as
"simple" and not "fanatical."^" In 1957, when asked if renewed interest in
religious duties involved a possible return to the Shari'a, the majority of
urban and educated Turks smilingly replied that there was no question of
such a "retrogression" implied in their actions. Villagers were of like mind.^'
In 1986, only seven percent ofthe people thought that the country should be
ruled in accordance with Shari'a laws.^^ In a nationwide survey carried out
in February 1999, a mere 0.6 percent of the respondents considered them-
selves "very much religiously oriented." In the same survey, only 8.0 percent
disagreed with the statement, "If a woman believes in God and the Prophet
Mohammed she would still be considered a Muslim even if she does not
cover her hair" and only 1.0 percent thought that adultery should be punished
according to Islam."
Therefore, what Dankwart A. Rustow had said ofthe National Salvation
Party {Milli Selamet Partisi or MSP) ofthe 1970s, Refah's predecessor, was
not surprising: "[the MSP] would feel profoundly repelled by any regime of
[Iran's] Shiite ayatollahs."^"* The MSP could garner 11.9 and 8.6 percent of
the votes in the 1973 and 1977 national elections, respectively. It is true that
in the 1995 national elections, Refah could obtain 21.3 percent ofthe votes.
This could, however, be explained primarily by secular rather than religious
factors. Prior to the elections, the moderate left and the moderate right were
divided among themselves; the secular parties had an unfavorable record
that included cases of corruption and constant squabbling among their
leaders, while, to many people, Refah was a symbol of integrity and
morality. Also the party had a very effective grassroots organization.^'
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Furthermore, Refah functioned as a social welfare agency. It secured
appointments for people in hospitals and other public agencies, and through
the municipalities it controlled, the party distributed coal, clothing, soup, and
food to the needy.̂ ** Then, in the 18 April 1999 national elections, at a time
when the secular establishment in Turkey talked of a serious threat from
political Islam, Refah's successor Fazilet (Virtue) Party obtained only 15.2
percent of the votes and came third after the Democratic Left Party and the
Nationalist Action Party.
All the same, when Refah became the senior partner of the coalition
government in 1996, as noted, many in the secular establishment perceived
Refah as a serious menace to Turkey's secular regime. They argued that the
party's endorsement ofthe secular-democratic order in Turkey was no more
than taqiyya,''-'' or dissimulating one's faith on grounds of expediency.^*
They pointed out that Refah leaders themselves had openly disclosed that
their party was not only an alternative to other political parties but also to the
secular-democratic order in Turkey.^'
Some students of Islam and politics in Turkey had a more generous view
of Refah. The latter thought that the party's mainstream leadership, if not a
few militants among the rank-and-file, was oriented toward the electoral
process.^" They argued that behind its radical rhetoric, Refah often showed
pragmatism and flexibility." It was pointed out that this was the result of a
strategic decision the party took in its Fourth Grand Congress (October
1993) to open up the party to new groups in the electorate."
Outside observers tended to side with the pessimists." Officers in
Turkey were among those who had serious concern about Refahyol. Conse-
quently, following the formation of Refahyol, there was talk among the
pessimists of either the eventual success of political Islam or another overt
military intervention in Turkey. Neither of the two scenarios materialized,
and a secularly oriented coalition government replaced Refahyol.
Later we first take up the developments that the military perceived as a
threat to Turkey's secular-democratic order. Next, we delineate how the
military tried to deal with that "threat" while trying to remain within the
formal legal rules and how in the end the crisis was defused.'"* Finally, we
discuss the Refahyol crisis from a comparative perspective and also offer
some thoughts about the likelihood of the consolidation of democracy in
Turkey in the near future.
The Military, Secularism, and Refah
From the very beginning, the military did not look with sympathy on
Refah's participation in government. Having strong suspicions about Refah's
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secular as well as democratic credentials, officers were worried lest Refah
had in mind "one man, one vote, one time." However, following Refahyol's
obtaining a vote of confidence (7 July 1996), in contrast to what the Algerian
military had done under similar circumstances, officers in Turkey adopted
a strategy of wait-and-see. In Algeria, the military had displayed opposition,
there had been an absence of a national consensus about the rights of the
opposition, and the military had been prone to act totally outside the law.
Thus, in 1992 the military in Algeria prevented the Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS) from coming to power and, furthermore, they eliminated the Front's
moderate political leadership.^'
In Turkey, during the wait-and-see period in question (July-December
1996), a report submitted to the National Security Council (MGK) by the
National Intelligence Agency (January 1997) indicated that a number of
religious orders and associations were trying to create "alternative state
structures."^* Another report prepared by the General Directorate of Secu-
rity pointed out that more than 300 Islamic organizations have been "trying
to bring back to Turkey an order based on Shari'a."^^ A second report by the
same Directorate noted that such Islamist groups as Hizballah (the Party of
God) and Islami BUyiik Akincilar Cephesi (Great Raiders' Front of Islam)
were particularly dangerous.^^ As would be expected, these reports further
alarmed the military.
The military also became disturbed by the accumulation of large
amounts of funds in the hands of some Islamic holding companies. Accord-
ing to the military intelligence, the funds collected from Turkish workers
abroad by the radical Turkish Islamic organizations based in other countries
were channeled to Islamic holding companies in Turkey. The military came
to the conclusion that the funds in question were being used to support the
cause of political Islam.^'
The military was also concemed about the number of students graduat-
ing from the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools (imam-Hatip Okullari)
(sixth through eleventh grades). According to the military's intelligence,
even though the annual need for religious functionaries in the late 1990s was
around 3000, every year more than 50,000 students graduated from these
schools. In addition, in the 1996-1997 academic year, 1,685,000 students
were attending the illegally offered Koran courses, and this number has been
doubling every year."" Although the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools
had been operating under the supervision ofthe Ministry of Education, there
were claims that the values and attitudes inculcated in students at these
schools could easily turn them into proponents of political Islam. The
military felt uneasy about Refah's further packing the public bureaucracy
with its co-ideologists.'"
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A more immediate concern ofthe military had to do with certain projects
Refah had in mind. According to one such project, (1) only those who knew
Arabic were to be admitted to the Foreign Ministry, (2) diplomats at foreign
posts were to practice their religion; chapels (mescit) were to be set up at
Turkish embassies, and (3) every Turkish representative abroad was to act
as a missionary for Islam. Refah also wanted the Chief of the General Staff
to report to the Minister of Defense rather than to the Prime Minister.
Certain statements made by some militant members of Refah also
alarmed the military. There was talk among the members of the secular
establishment of closing the middle school sections (grades six to eight) of
Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools, in effect making eight-year secular
education (five years at the grade school and three years at the middle school)
compulsory. In reaction to this idea, one Refah deputy from the city of Sanli
Urfa, Ibrahim Halil ^elik, said: "If you close these schools there would be
bloodshed. It would be worse than Algeria. In such an eventuality I will be
rejoiced to see bloodshed!.... The army could not deal with even 3,500-
strong PKK [the Kurdish Workers' Party]. How will it cope with six million
Islamists?'"*^ Earlier, another Refah deputy from Ankara, Hasan Huseyin
Ceylan, had stated that if Refah controlled the military academies, Turkey
would be a much nicer place to live. He claimed that guns and tanks could
not destroy Refah, adding that Turkey met its tragic end when it began to be
ruled by a parliament. According to this deputy, the country was reborn
when religiously oriented parties were formed, Refah being the last such
party."*' Still earlier, Refah parliamentarian Sevki Yilmaz had said that when
he was mayor of the city of Rize, on national days he did not attend the
ceremonies held in front ofthe statues of Ataturk. In his opinion "visiting a
blind and deaf rock was a sign of one's being a retarded person.'"*"*
The military was also greatly upset by the so-called Jerusalem Night
organized on 5 February 1997 by the Refah-controlled Sincan Municipality
on the outskirts of Ankara. In a play staged in a makeshift tent, the
protagonists booed Arafat, made statements along the lines used by the
militant Hizbullah, and called for the return of Shari'a. This seems to have
been the last straw. Four days later, tanks roamed the streets of Sincan.
Everybody received the message; however, unwilling to make an overt
intervention in politics, the military insisted that it was part of a preplanned
military exercise.
After becoming the senior partner in Refahyol, Refah had given some
signs of developing into a pro-system party with respect to the issue of
secularism. For instance, it had scrapped its Islamic economic program ofthe
Just Order (Adil DiJzen), which was, among other things, against such an
interest. The party had also abandoned its rhetoric against the West in
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general and Israel in particular, and had even ratified a defense agreement
with Israel.*' Perhaps to make up for these "concessions" and appease its not
too large but militant activists, Erbakan condoned certain acts and state-
ments by the latter. The military perceived Erbakan's soft stance on this
matter as evidence of his thinking along the same lines as well. After all,
before Refahyol was formed, Erbakan himself was guilty of similar state-
ments, although in each case he had later pointed out that he was misunder-
stood. On one such occasion, he had even declared that Islamists "will come
to power either through normal channels or by shedding blood.'"**
The military became doubly alarmed when, shortly after becoming
Prime Minister, Erbakan visited a number of militantly Islamic states,
including Iran and Libya. While in Iran, Erbakan openly expressed doubt
about the soundness of the earlier unfavorable briefing given to him by the
Turkish National Intelligence Agency {Milli Istihbarat Te^kilati or MIT)
about Iran. In Libya, when Muammar Qadhafi had publicly accused past
Turkish governments for having acted in the interests ofthe U.S. and Israel
and called for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in south-
eastern Turkey, Erbakan remained silent. In the same speech, Qadhafi had
talked of a Supreme Council of Islamic Commanders under his command,
and had disclosed Erbakan's being a member of that Council; Erbakan did
not deny it.
Erbakan's inviting the leaders of religious orders, including the militant
ones, to a dinner party at his prime ministerial residence and religious leaders
attending the dinner in their religious garb (11 January 1997), was the last
milestone in the unfolding of the recent political crisis in Turkey. For one
thing, the prime minister had overlooked the violation of one of the
Republic's most important Westernizing legislation—the Dress Code—
which forbade religious personages to put on their religious clothing in
public—let alone, of course, in the official residence of the prime minister.
Even more significantly, following the dinner, one of the religious leaders
had openly said that they had helped Refah to garner votes in the elections."'
The Military, Democracy, and Refah
The military in Turkey had always sought to find the appropriate
formula to enhance democracy in that country.''^ Thus, the commanders
expressed their concern about political Islam openly for the first time at a
meeting ofthe National Security Council (MGK) (17 August 1996), noting
that the activities of militant Islamists constituted a major threat for Turkey.
They proposed that the MGK should look into this matter at its next
meeting.'" President Suleyman Demirel, who was chairing this meeting and
Heper and Giiney 643
who was anxious to prevent a showdown between the military and the
civilian government, remained noncommittal; he merely pointed out that the
MGK "could, of course, take up the matter."^"
Following the meeting, the president wrote letters to Refahyol leaders,
warning them to act prudently on the issue of political Islam. At the same
time, the president asked the commanders to remain in their barracks.
Refahyol leaders did not pay attention to the president's warning. On 20
December 1996, a high-ranking general offered the view that nobody should
expect a solution to the political problems from the military; rather, the
solution should come from the civil society and the parliament.^' To back
up this view, on 24 December 1996, Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Ismail
Hakki Karadayi pointed out that both secularism, "which is the very essence
of intellectual progress, liberty of conscience, and democracy," and liberal
democracy, "which is the lifestyle of free, civilized, and modern individu-
als," are the fundamental characteristics of the Turkish Republic.^^ The
government gave short shrift to these statements, too.
At the 26 December 1996 meeting ofthe MGK, the commanders noted
that since August of 1996, the Islamic threat had become greater by the day
and reiterated their request that this matter be placed on the agenda of the
MGK. The president was again noncommittal, indicating that he was going
to look into the matter. The council's post-meeting press bulletin made it
clear that at this stage too the council had left it to the government to adopt
the necessary measures.
At the same time, the commanders set up the so-called West Study
Group (Bati Calif ma Grubu) (B^G) in the General Staff headquarters. The
B^G was to monitor the activities threatening the secular republic and plan
appropriate measures lest they become necessary. Among other things, the
B^G was to explore which groups might lend support to the military and
which groups to the militant Islamists if an armed confrontation took place
between them."
Demirel continued his efforts to defuse the crisis by keeping close
contact with CGS Karadayi and sending new warning signals to Erbakan and
filler. On 18 January 1997, in a briefing they gave to him, the commanders
told the president that political Islam had become the number one threat and
that the high command had no choice but to "actively concern itself with that
threat."'"*
At the next critical meeting ofthe MGK (27 January 1997), commanders
complained that the activities of the militant Islamists were still not on the
agenda of the MGK. The president replied by saying that he continued to
warn the government about the Islamic threat, adding that nobody could
substitute another regime for Turkey's secular-democratic republic. The
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commanders' response was that they were well aware of the president's
earnest endeavors conceming this matter, but Prime Minister Erbakan and
Deputy Prime Minister filler were refraining from taking the necessary
measures; worse still, they were acting against the laws enacted to safeguard
secularism." They drew attention to the prime minister's notorious invitation
ofthe leaders ofthe religious orders to his official residence and to the fact that
the deputy prime minister had recently said, "Politics is at the disposal of
religion."'* Commanders let it be known that ifthe MGK did not take up the
matter it would be held responsible by the future generations.''
The president came to the conclusion that it would no longer be
appropriate to prevent the council from discussing the issue at length. At the
same time he wanted to give the impression that the discussion of the issue
by the military did not mean that the military was taking things into its own
hands. He argued that the commanders participated at the MGK meetings
not as spokespersons for the armed forces but as the higher functionaries of
the state who had expertise on security issues.'^ Only after making this point
did the president point out that the issue of political Islam was going to be
on the agenda of MGK's next meeting on 28 February 1997.
The president spent the following four weeks trying to prevent a head-
on clash between the commanders and Refahyol. In a letter to Erbakan, the
president wrote: "Article 2 of the Constitution stipulates that Turkish
Republic is a democratic, secular, and social state based on rule of
law....Threats the anti-secularist activities pose for the secular Republican
State give rise to serious concern both in the society and in the state
institutions. I would like to bring to your attention the need to implement
intact those laws enacted to safeguard secularism...and prevent the funda-
mentalist views from penetrating into schools, local governments, universi-
ties, the judiciary, and the military."" On the religious Lesser Festival {id
al-fitr)^ (8 February 1997), in a message to the nation, the president's tone
became harsher: "The exploitation of the people's religious feelings for
political purposes constitutes a felony."*' He invited the public prosecutors
to be vigilant on this matter, and asked civil societal groups to shed their
indifference and play a more active role. Both Erbakan and filler still could
not figure out the gravity ofthe situation, filler even declared that in the next
elections her party could form an alliance with Refah.*^
Demirel talked with Erbakan for the last time on February 21st, and
reportedly "told him everything that could be said." He then advised
Karadayi that it was necessary to have patience and stay "within the
Constitution" and that "if one's patience snaps Turkey would face great
difficulties in the days to come." At the time, Demirel told those close to him
that he was trying to "put out the fire." *̂
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At the 28 February 1997 meeting ofthe MGK, the commanders pointed
out that if those who govern the country overlooked the threat the secular-
democratic republic faced and, to add insult to the injury, they themselves
used religion for political ends, the republic would tatter at its very founda-
tions. The commanders urged the members of the council to recommend to
the government the necessary measures, adding that otherwise a critical
threshold would be crossed, the implication being that then the military
would be obliged to deal with the threat unilaterally. Deputy Prime Minister
filler attempted to defend Refahyol by saying that religion could not be used
for political purposes because she and her colleagues in her party—DYP—
stood guard for secularism. The commanders retorted by pointing out that
they did so only in words and but not in deeds and gave some examples. As
compared to filler, Erbakan was more soft-spoken. He did not challenge the
commanders; he only requested that the council's recommendations should
be expressed in general terms, adding that otherwise he would have
problems in explaining them to his rank and file. Demirel, too, tried to make
the recommendations more palatable to Refah so that Erbakan would sign
the final document and the matter would not lead to a further escalation of
the already tense political situation. The meeting ended by the MGK making
eighteen recommendations to the government. Among those, the MGK
wanted to see pupils attending a secular school for eight years before
studying at the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools.
The government dragged its feet on the MGK's recommendations. At
the same time, to prevent the military from making a drastic move, Erbakan
kept on saying that his party had harmonious relations with the military. The
commanders tersely pointed out that that they "could not be in good terms
with those who acted against the Ataturkist principles."*"*
Still, the commanders did not press the issue in the next scheduled
(March 1997) meeting of the council, with the hope that the government
would soon start moving and they would not have to take unilateral action.
At the April 1997 meeting of the council, the commanders once more
brought the issue to the table. At the meeting, the necessity of monitoring the
short, middle, and long-term planning, programming, coordinating, and
budgeting concerning the measures to be adopted was acknowledged.
The commanders were reluctant to take unilateral action, but they were
intent on not letting the matter be put on the back burner. On April 29th, the
General Staff gave a briefing to the members of the media about the threat
of political Islam. Meanwhile, in March and April, every night, starting at
9.00 p.m. sharp, many people began to protest Refahyol by turning off and
on their lights at home for ten minutes. The people had started to display their
support for the military. According to a nationwide survey conducted in
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October 1990, compared to other institutions in Turkey, the people had
highest trust in the military (91.7%). The same study had shown that only
49.7% of the respondents had trust in the political system.*' At the time,
through a number of public statements they made, the peak organizations of
interest group associations representing both business and labor also ex-
pressed their deep dissatisfaction with Refahyol.
The government still did not act. In order to put more pressure on
Refahyol, on May 26th the commanders held an extraordinary meeting of
the Supreme Military Council and dismissed a number of commissioned and
noncommissioned officers on the grounds that they had sympathies for
political Islam. At this point, Demirel told journalists that he had requested to
CGS Karadayi that the military should refrain from making public statements.
The president also pointed to "the need for an early election."** On June 10th,
the general staff gave still another set of briefings first to the judiciary and
the academia, then to the media, and finally to the business groups in order
to mobilize the public in the hope that Refahyol would respond.
As the pressure on Refahyol increased, filler perceived this as her
opportunity to take over the prime ministry from Erbakan. She first ap-
proached CGS Karadayi and asked him to support a minority government
led by her. Karadayi told her that this was the exclusive business of the
president and the parliament.*' filler then told Erbakan that the pressure
from the military was unbearable and, therefore, Erbakan and she should
change posts. Erbakan who apparently could not figure out whether the
military would or would not take power into its own hands, agreed. On June
18th, Erbakan submitted his resignation to the president, both filler and he
having in mind a game of musical chairs between them.
The president, however, surprised them by appointing Mesut Yilmaz,
leader ofthe Motherland Party, as prime minister, despite the fact that (filler
and Erbakan together commanded a majority in parliament at the time. Soon,
however, that majority melted down, and a new coalition comprising the
Motherland Party, the Democratic Left Party, and the Democratic Turkey
Party, supported from outside by the (new) Republican People's Party,
received a vote of confidence. This was a coalition of secularly oriented
parties. The commanders stated that they would continue to monitor the
developments in the problem of political Islam, but that "now there was
no need for them to be actively involved concerning the efforts to tackle
that problem." When, however, at one point new Prime Minister Yilmaz
asserted that now the government and not the military was responsible for
dealing with the problem of political Islam,*** the military retorted that they
had a constitutional duty to act as a watchdog conceming this critical
matter.®
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On 16 January 1998, the Constitutional Court dissolved Refah, on the
grounds that it had attempted to establish a state based on Islam. The court
used as evidence some of the statements by militant Refahis noted above.
Erbakan and four other Refahis, including Ibrahim Halil ^elik, Hasan
HUseyin Ceylan, and 5evki Yilmaz, were banned from active politics for five
years.
Refah was succeeded by the Fazilet (Virtue) Party, which is led by a
moderate leader—Recai Kutan. With Fazilet, secularism began to be de-
fined as religion not interfering in the affairs ofthe state and the state leaving
religion alone. Women, including those who did not cover their hair and
openly consumed alcoholic drinks, took their places not only in the munici-
palities the party controlled but also in the parliament.™ Perhaps most
significantly, party members began to ask the crucial question of "where did
we go wrong?" "
Still, in the 18 April 1999 elections, Fazilet came fourth, in all probabil-
ity due to the Refahyol debacle. The new government that has been formed
by three secularly oriented parties (the Democratic Left Party, the Nation-
alist Action Party, and the Motherland Party), with Bulent Ecevit as Prime
Minister, has so far displayed an effective and prudent governance and, not
unexpectedly, has had cordial relations with the military. In December 1999,
Turkey was designated as a candidate for full membership in the European
Union. The military gladly received this development, although it would
require it to have a definitely subordinate role to civilian governments.
The Turkish Case in Perspective
The recent Refahyol-military confrontation over political Islam in
Turkey has shown that although civilian supremacy over the military has not
yet been fully established, there is little reason to expect a direct military
intervention in that country. Officers are not enthusiastic even for indirect
intervention. When officers feel some kind of intervention is absolutely
necessary, they make that intervention by mobilizing the democratic
forces and by trying to remain within the legal framework. Despite the
fact that in 1996-1997 commanders perceived political Islam as a
serious threat to the secular-democratic state in Turkey they did not
resort to direct action. Instead, they chose to pressure the government via
a constitutionally sanctioned mechanism—the MGK—to act more pru-
dently. They justified their limited intervention in politics by reference to the
constitutional provisions and their internal code that saddled them with the
responsibility of safeguarding the republic from internal as well as external
threats.
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In the wake of the military's intervention in politics in 1980, Frank
Tachau and one of the present authors had commented that "it should
occasion little surprise...if the military retain (either overtly or covertly)
some share of the guardianship of the state.'"^ Recently the military in
Turkey chose a moderating role—exercising influence and even effecting a
change of government—without taking the helm of government into its
hands. The military tried everything it could so that they would not feel
obliged to escalate their moderating role to a guardianship role—tiiking
power into their hands, clearing up "the mess," and then returning to their
barracks.
It may be argued that during the Refahyol crisis the military, in fact,
acted basically as a pressure group, that is, as a group that aims to promote
the general interest as it itself interprets it, without trying to come to office.
It was true that the military as a pressure group was more than primus inter
pares. And, of course, if absolutely necessary, its exhortations could be
backed up by effective "sanctions." Still, the comrrianders preferred to have
support in the polity. They attempted to recruit to the "common cause"
various civil societal groups—the secularly oriented media, interest group
associations of the business and labor—such bureaucratic groups as the
judiciary and the academia, and the people themselves. They found a
receptive and, in fact, an enthusiastic audience. No doubt this was in part a
consequence of their high prestige in the polity. Such "outside" support
facilitated a basically "non-armed forces solution" to the crisis.
Particularly critical for arriving at such a solution was the significant role
President Demirel had played. Demirel prevented the crisis from escalating
to a point of no return. He assured the commanders that a "non-armed forces
solution" was possible. On the other hand, he kept the anti-Refahyol
sentiment under control so that no major confrontation took place between
the secularists and Islamists." As a consequence, secularists did not send
signals to the military that they should intervene, as some secularists had
done on the eve of the 1971 military intervention.'''
Another contributing factor for a "non-armed forces solution" to the
crisis was the new ability of the majority of the secularly oriented political
parties to set aside their differences and cooperate when the country faced
a serious threat to the secular and democratic state. It should also be noted
that when filler chose not to join the bandwagon, because of her anger at
having been "ignominiously removed from power," some of her close
colleagues deserted her.
Another important development that would render this solution even
more likely in the future is that, from the National Order Party to Fazilet, the
religiously oriented parties in Turkey gradually freed themselves from the
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clutches of an Islamic ideology in order to appeal to larger groups of the
electorate. The closure of these parties by either the constitutional court or
in the wake of military intervention on the grounds that they promoted
political Islam, provided a further momentum to this development. Conse-
quently, Refah increasingly took on the trappings of a pro-system party. It
came to power through democratic means. It used its Islamist themes
basically to explain what was fundamentally wrong with the country,
describing to the electorate fundamental mistakes the previous governments
had made. Once in power, Refah shed many of its earlier Utopian, if not
militant, Islamic views.
The change had, in fact, started when Refah's predecessor—the Na-
tional Salvation Party (MSP)—was in power (1972-1980). During those
years, as compared with the period ofthe National Order Party (1970-1972),
the MSP's predecessor, there was a tendency to have relations with the then
European Economic Organization and an inclination to engender reform in
specific state institutions rather than sweeping changes in the constitution."
When Refah replaced the MSP, secular and religious world views were not
seen as incompatible. Refah defined secularism as the freedom to practice
one's religion according to one's belief and without harassment.^*" The
Refahis referred to the members of secular parties as "incompetent politi-
cians" and not as "false Muslims," as their predecessors had done.^' On a
symbolic level, but not less significantly, women began to attend party
congresses, though with their hair covered, and more men began to wear
neckties.^*
It is true that the Refah party in general garnered votes in Turkey's
underdeveloped regions." And there had been ethnic support for the party
in the eastern and southeastern provinces.^" However, Refah had essentially
been a party of forward vision, placing emphasis on modern science and
technocracy, and not a party of protest and rejection. If this had not been the
case, in all probability Refah's votes would have been considerably fewer
because the "Turks have been looking forward, not back."*'
Since the mid-1990s, Refah has adopted the procedural rules of democ-
racy—those designating the constitutional means of competing for and
holding political office.*^ The party has not considered coming to power by
means other than elections. Following its removal from office, many in the
party began to seek an answer to the question of where the party had gone
wrong. As noted, Recai Kutan, the leader of the Virtue Party, successor party
to Refah, has so far given the impression that he is a leader with more
moderate views than Erbakan on the issue of secularism. It is probable that
in the near future, a moderate and an innovative generation of Islamist
politicians will take over from the less moderate and orthodox old guard and
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Fazilet will definitely turn into a pro-system party. In Turkey, neither
political Islam nor military rule seems to be in the cards, and the indications
are that in the near future occasional indirect military presence in the polity
will be replaced by consolidated democracy.
For the latter transformation to take place the military will need to have
greater faith in the capability as well as the prudence of civilian governments.
When the military has such faith, not only will there be no reason for military
intervention, but Turkey will also have a "maximalist" notion of democracy,
that is, the full hegemony of democratic values in the polity in addition to the
holding of competitive elections on a regular basis. The consolidation of a
"maximalist" notion of democracy in Turkey may take some time, because
of the officers' penchant for "rational democracy" and because, at least until
recently, of nonprudent political leadership.*' We say "until recently"
because, as noted, the government formed by the three secularly oriented
parties following the 18 April 1999 elections has so far displayed an effective
and prudent governance that Turkey had lacked for quite some time.
During and in the wake of the Refahyol crisis, the Turkish military's
approach to politics resembled those of their counterparts in France and
Germany of the earlier decades. In both France and Germany the military
identified its destiny with that of the nation.^ For instance, in both 1958
France and 1996-1997 Turkey, officers believed that civilians were indif-
ferent to the long-term interests of the community. As officers in both
countries conceived of themselves as national political overseers, they
thought that when the national interest was in peril, but only then, they
should set things right. Neither former French nor present-day Turkish
officers were avid power seekers; in fact, both sets of officers remained aloof
from day-to-day politicking. Their preference was to stay on the sidelines
and obey political rulers. If they thought they had to come into the picture,
they preferred the role of arbiter to that of exercising a veto power, and the
latter to actual intervention. When they were engaged in "extracurricular
activities," they wished to return to silence as soon as possible. During the
recent decades, due to the absence of strong and effective governments, the
Turkish military has been in the limelight more often than it would have
preferred.
In France and Germany of the earlier decades and historically and
presently in Turkey, the military constituted an integral part of what they
considered a non-politicized state. In all three countries, at times they
intervened in politics as the state elite and not as the political elite. They were
not in a political competition with the political elite. They considered
themselves as nonpartisan arbiters, and not as rivals to the political elite.
Most ofthe time they have been on the sidelines and not in the political swirl.
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not because they have been forced to act in that manner, but because they
thought it was proper for them to act in that manner.
Given the above characteristics of the military-civilian relations in
Turkey, the theories formulated with a view to the democratization in Latin
American countries on the one hand and Eastern European countries on the
other do not have an explanatory value in the Turkish case. As noted, the
recent democratization in Latin America has been explained by the theory
of the mode-of-transition to civilian politics. According to this theory,
whether the military had obtained too many privileges or not at the time of
transition to multiparty politics is important. The assumption here is that if
the military had too many privileges, then its full extrication from politics
would be difficult. In Brazil, the military, which was obliged to enter into a
pact with civilians through a process of bargaining, nevertheless continued
to occupy six ofthe 22 cabinet posts. They scuttled the agrarian reform and
blocked for some time the granting of the right to strike to workers.*^
In Turkey, the military dominated the polity during the 1980-1983
interregnum. Yet in 1983, the military had completely returned to its
barracks. Its participation in state affairs was limited to its role in the MGK;
they did not concern themselves with social and economic policies, as their
counterparts in Brazil had done.
In Argentina, the National Defense Law of 1988 separated external
defense, the domain of the military, from internal security, for which
essentially police forces and border patrols were made responsible. The law
also banned the military from planning scenarios for internal conflict and
from using military intelligence for domestic purposes. The same law also
denied the military a seat on the National Defense Council, enabling
civilians to set defense priorities all by themselves.** Even in Brazil similar
processes were in motion. For instance, defense expenditures were cut and
pork barrel spending increased.*'
In Turkey, despite the increased democratization of the regime, the
military's prerogatives were kept almost intact.** And the military contin-
ued to use the MGK to influence government policy in those matters that they
considered critical for the internal and external security of the country.
Similarly, the theory of electoral logic developed with a view to the
democratization experience of Eastern European countries does not have an
explanatory value in the Turkish case.*' As noted, according to this theory,
democratization took place as progressive encroachments on the interests of
the military by political parties that competed among themselves to garner
votes. Following the demise of the communist regimes in Eastern European
countries, the officers in those countries lost their former prestige. They were
perceived as the servants of foreign (Soviet) and ideological (communist)
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rather than national interests. In contrast to the Latin American experi-
ence, democratization in Eastern Europe started with weak military
establishments. Under these circumstances, in such countries as Roma-
nia and Poland, where presidential systems were adopted, the civilian
executives politicized the military in order to use it for their own
purpose. In Romania, for instance, the president expected the military to
back his personal rule instead of defending the constitutional order. This
has placed Romanian democracy in peril; the military in that country
was seen as enthusiastic to take power into its own hands in case of
political disorder. In many other countries, among which Hungary is the best
example, the military was inculcated with democratic values and, at the same
time, developed into a professional corps. In the latter set of countries, where
parliamentary systems of government were adopted, the military became
subservient to civilian politicians and were not inclined to intervene in
politics.
In Turkey, in the wake of a return to democracy, officers were not in a
weak position. Consequently, they could not be politicized by the civilian
elite and turned into an instrument at the latter's disposal. The Turkish
military always subscribed to the republican principles of secularism and
(cultural) nationalism, and were perceived by the bulk of the populace as
defenders ofthe national interest. On the other hand, from the 1950s onward,
particularly following Turkey's becoming a member of the NATO, the
military progressively developed into a professional body. In addition to
their being always aloof from day-to-day politics, this fact also contributed
to their basic unwillingness to be continuously involved in the swirl of
politics. In their view, their interventions in politics undermined their
combat effectiveness and esprit de corps.
The theory of "the mode-of-transition" has an explanatory value in the
"politicized state of Latin America," to use Douglas Chalmers' terminol-
ogy.^ The theory of "the electoral logic" and the politicized military versus
a professional military dichotomy has an explanatory value in Eastern
Europe, where the military could either be completely politicized or turned
into a nonpoliticized professional body. Both theories are inadequate to
explain civil-military relations in such countries as present-day Turkey as
well as France and Germany of the earlier decades where there were
professional, though "staticized," militaries. In the latter category of coun-
tries, there has been a state distinct from society and above politics," and
democracy was a regime granted from above and not a regime forged
through multiple confrontations, bargaining, and the professionalization of
the military by civilian politicians.'^ In such settings, particularly in Turkey,
"historical institutionalism" that pays attention to the factors that determine
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the political orientations of officers, would provide better clues concerning
the consolidation of democracy.
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